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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to recommence the action, pending in the New York courts since 1969
and now ready for trial, in the Province of Ontario, and the fact that
the site of the accident and the plaintiff's residence, although in Can-
ada, were only a few miles from the courthouse.
As courts continue to exert their expanded discretion with respect
to the exercise of jurisdiction, further refinements will be engrafted
upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The decision in Neu-
meier is consistent with the Court of Appeals' view that a pertinent
factor to be weighed is "the unavailability elsewhere of a forum in
which the plaintiff may obtain effective redress .. ."10 A court should
properly be reluctant to invoke the doctrine at the insistence of a
resident defendant where the plaintiff would otherwise be faced with
the prospect of bringing suit on a foreign judgment.
ARTICLE 10- PAgnES GENERALLY
CPLR 1025: Obstacles to an action against an unincorporated associa-
tion.
Section 13 of the General Associations Law, incorporated by ref-
erence into the CPLR by section 1025,r' provides that a party with a
claim against all the members of an unincorporated association may
seek recovery from the association itself by maintaining an action
against its president or treasurer.52 The association is considered a na-
tural person for purposes of service of process.53
It has generally been held that these sections are purely procedural,
and that the traditional rule remains that the association's treasury
cannot be reached unless the act or agreement giving rise to the claim
has been ratified by all the members of the organization.54 A recent case
in the District Court of Nassau County provides an illustration. In
Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Empire Employees Sunshine Club,r5 the lessor
of a coffee-making machine attempted to recover the balance due on a
50 Varkonyi v. Varig, 22 N.Y.2d 333, 338, 239 N.E.2d 542, 544, 292 N.YS.2d 670, 673
(1968) (emphasis added).
51 CPLR 1025 states in part: "..actions may be brought by or against the president
or treasurer of an unincorporated association on behalf of the association in accordance
with the provisions of the general associations law."
52 N.Y. GEN. Ass'Ns LAw § 13 (McKinney 1973). See Stefania v. McNiff, 49 Misc. 2d
480, 482, 267 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1966).
53 The "person" of the association is the president or treasurer and therefore per-
sonal jurisdiction can be obtained by personal service on one of these officers within New
York. Since the association is deemed a natural person, this is a sufficient jurisdictional
basis, and the "doing business" concept is inapplicable. See Gross v. Cross, 28 Misc. 2d
375, 211 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961).
54 Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (1951).
55 74 Misc. 2d 328, 845 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1973).
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lease with an unincorporated association consisting of the employees
of a major insurance company. The action failed on the basis of nu-
merous procedural defects, but the court stated that, even apart from
these objections, the absence of a showing of ratification would have
been a bar.'6
The rules regarding the liability of unincorporated associations,
largely historical in origin, have been criticized. At common law, the
association was perceived not as an entity, but as an aggregate of indi-
viduals joined together under a common name to serve various civic,
social and charitable purposes.57 The conceptual distinction between an
aggregate and an entity gave rise to the ratification requirement. Since
an aggregate could not have an agent, the only way it could act was
through the concurrence of all its members. Thus an association was
not bound by the act of an individual purporting to act for it if all the
members did not authorize the action.58
Criticism of the ratification requirement stems largely from the
fact that the character of unincorporated associations has changed dras-
tically. When the rule developed, they were primarily small, close-knit
and community-based. Today, the designation "unincorporated associ-
ation" has been applied to a wide range of organizations of varying
size, scope and economic power.59 Labor unions in particular possess
characteristics more analogous to corporations than to the common law
notion of an unincorporated association.60
This form of immunity has been justified on the ground that the
law seeks to encourage membership in private associations.6' But there
exists the countervailing consideration of providing an effective remedy
for one who is wronged. In this regard, the distinction is sometimes
drawn between contract and tort actions. In an action brought on con-
tract, the argument lies that the plaintiff had notice that the association
is not a legal entity and thus dealt with it at his peril.62 The victim of a
56 Id. at 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
57 Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 NXE.2d 683 (1951); Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N.Y.
353, 55 N.E. 919 (1900); Prin v. DeLuca, 218 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961).
58 See Comment, Liability of Members and Officers of Non-Profit Unincorporated As-
sociations for Contracts and Torts, 42 CALiF. L. Ray. 812, 817 (1954).
59 See Note, Hazards of Enforcing Claims Against Unincorporated Associations in
Florida, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 211 (1964).
Co See Marshall v. I.L.W.U., 57 Cal. 2d 781, 371 P.2d 987, 22 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1962)
(labor union deemed a "separate legal entity" for purposes of a personal injury suit
against the union by one of its members); Oleck, Nonprofit Unincorporated Associations,
21 CLEy. ST. L. Rav. 44 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Oleck].
61 See Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associa-
tions, 76 HARnv. L. REv. 983, 987-89 (1963).
02 Judge Conway, dissenting in Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 296, 101 N.E.2d 683,
694 (1951), stated that "[k]nowledge of the limited liability of the association's members
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tort, on the other hand, generally has had no opportunity to weigh the
disadvantages of dealing with the association. But whether an injured
party's claim against an association is in tort or contract, the protection
afforded its assets by the law has been looked upon with growing dis-
favor.63 Some commentators have urged legislation that would treat
unions as independent entities for substantive purposes.04 On the fed-
eral level, the Taft-Hartley Act provides that a labor union "may sue or
be sued as an entity,"65 and abandons the ratification requirement.66
Even without such legislation, the New York Court of Appeals has held
that ratification by the membership need not be proved in an action
for wrongful expulsion from a labor organization. 67
The common law also embodied procedural obstacles to a suit
against an incorporated association. For example, all the members of
the organization were deemed necessary parties to an action against it.
Many states now permit suit by or against the association in its common
name.6 8 As noted above, however, New York requires that the action
be brought in the name of the president or treasurer,69 and that the
summons and complaint are techincally defective if they contain only
the association name. Although liberal amendment of the pleadings is
generally allowed,70 unnecessary inconvenience results from this rule.71
and the limited authority of the association's agent in entering into the specific contract
is chargeable to the third party." See Note, Hazards of Enforcing Claims Against Unin-
corporated Associations in Florida, 17 U. FLA. L. Ra,. 211, 239-40 (1964).
63 In recent years the courts have shown a tendency to fasten liability on both the
organization and all persons concerned in wrongs committed by labor unions. Oleck, su-
pra note 60, at 49. However the author notes that, due to the "vagueness of organiza-
tional liability," unions "sometimes fall in a liability twilight zone .... ." Id.
64 See, e.g., 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 1025, supp. commentary at 135 (1973), where Dean
McLaughlin states:
[P]erhaps legislation should be considered which would distinguish between unin-
corporated associations of the civic club variety and associations as large as labor
unions. The obvious differences in function and in finance would seem to indicate
that more careful thought should be given to the General Associations Law...
[A] comprehensive legislative analysis seems in order.
65 Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970).
66Id. § 301(e), 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1970).
67 See Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1958), dis-
tinguishing Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 688 (1951).
68 See, e.g., GAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 388 (West 1973). See generally Comment, Liability
of Members and Officers of Nonprofit Unincorporated Associations for Contracts and
Torts, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 812 (1954).
69 N.Y. GEN. ASS'Ns LAW § 13 (McKinney 1973).
70 But see King v. Town of Oyster Bay, 194 N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup, Ct. Nassau County
1959), where the court refused to allow a nunc pro tunc substitution of the treasurer of
the association as defendant since the statute of limitations had expired. The court
quoted Motor Haulage Co. v. Teamsters Local 807, 298 N.Y. 208; 212, 81 N.E.2d 91, 92
(1948), wherein it was held that such amendment may be allowed "in the absence of
prejudice to a substantial right of any party."
71 See Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L.J. 583,
405 (1924); 2 WK&M 1025.06.
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It is urged that the Legislature respond to the difficulties presented
by the diverse and complex nature of unincorporated associations.
Those associations that function as major forces in society should be
subject to those obligations imposed on corporate bodies. Labor unions
in particular should be treated as entities for substantive as well as pro-
cedural purposes. Unincorporated associations should possess the capac-
ity to sue or be sued in their own name, and the association's treasury
must be available to satisfy a judgment resulting from the activities
of its members in areas germane to the organization's normal purposes
or functions. An examination of this area of the law is long overdue.
ARTcL 11 - POOR PERSONS
CPLR 1102: Indigent defendant has constitutional right to counsel in
matrimonial action.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,72 the United States Supreme Court held
that a state's refusal to allow an indigent divorce plaintiff access to its
courts without first paying fees for filing and service of process violates
his due process rights. The New York courts have applied this holding
to auxiliary expenses such as publication costs.7
Boddie recently received a broad construction by the Supreme
Court, Kings County. In Vanderpool v. Vanderpool,74 the court held
that the defendant-wife in a divorce action was constitutionally entitled
to counsel where her indigency and her husband's inability to payT5 are
undisputed. Relying on the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the court found that while CPLR 110276 gives the court discre-
tion to assign counsel to poor persons, it confers no authority to direct
payment of counsel fees. However, the court reasoned that without
counsel a defendant has no meaningful opportunity to be heard, and
the mere fact that he is in the action as a defendant does not constitute
access since "presence is distinguishable from access ... 77
72401 U.S. 871 (1971).
73 See, e.g., Deason v. Deason, 32 N.Y.2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1978);
Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 88 App. Div. 2d 431, 830 N.Y.S.d 550 (2d Dep't 1972); McCandless v.
McCandless, 88 App. Div. 2d 171, 827 N.Y.S.2d 896 (4th Dep't 1972).
74 74 Misc. 2d 122, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1978) (mem.).
75 DRL 287 provides that generally the husband can be compelled to pay the wife's
counsel fees if she is unable to do so.
76 CPLR 1102(a) provides that "[t]he court in its order permitting a person to pro-
ceed as a poor person may assign an attorney." The meaning of "may" in this context
is unsettled. See 2 WIMM 1102.01 (suggesting that the appointment of counsel is dis-
cretionary); but see 7B McOKNY's CPLR 1102, commentary at 480 (1963) (suggesting
that the validity of an order to proceed as a poor person when the court does not ap.
point counsel is an open question).
7774 Misc. 2d at 125, 844 N.YS.2d at 576 (emphasis in original), citing Gideon v.
Wainwright, 872 U.S. 835 (1968).
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